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We study the interdependence of lending decisions in different country branches of a 
multinational bank. This is done both theoretically and empirically. First, we formulate a 
model of a bank that delegates the management of its foreign unit to a local manager with 
non-transferable skills. The bank differs from other international investors due to a liquidity 
threshold which induces a depositor run and a regulatory action if attained. Therefore, 
lending decisions are influenced by delegation and precautionary motives. We then show that 
these two phenomena create a separate channel of shock propagation, a function of bank 
shareholder and manager incentives. The workings of this channel can lead to either 
“contagion”, meaning parallel reactions of the loan volumes in both countries to the parent 
bank home country disturbance, or standard “diversification”, when the reactions of a 
standard international portfolio optimizer within the two country units go in opposite 
directions. In particular, it can happen that the impact of an exogenous shock on credit has a 
different sign in the “relationship” as opposed to the “arm’s-length” banking environment. 
Second, we construct a large sample of multinational banks and their branches/subsidiaries 
and look for the presence of lending contagion by panel regression methods. We obtain 
mixed results concerning contagion depending on the parent bank home country and the host 
economy of cross-border penetration. While the majority of multinational banks behave in 
line with the contagion effect, more than one-third do not. In addition, the presence of 
contagion seems to be related to the geographical location of subsidiaries. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
The present paper investigates the question of cross-border shock transmission in loan provision 
by an internationally active bank. Understanding the driving forces behind lending policies by a 
multinational bank (MNB) in individual countries of operation is important both theoretically and 
politically. Regulators in the country of incorporation of the parent bank are often concerned 
about destabilizing spillovers on it from foreign country units. These concerns are motivated by 
the fact that MNBs usually belong to the leading institutions of the banking sector on the national 
level and are systemically important. The same concerns often surface in the reasoning of rating 
agencies: it is known that an MNB sometimes suffers a downgrade when considered 
“overstretched” by foreign bank acquisitions. Conversely, policymakers in countries where MNBs 
play an important role may fear that a shock affecting the parent bank, although totally unrelated 
to domestic economic or financial fundamentals, can distort lending decisions within their 
jurisdiction. 
The paper focuses on the latter aspect, in that it investigates the probable causes and empirical 
relevance of lending contagion from the parent bank itself, or economic conditions in its home 
country, to a branch/subsidiary in a different country. (We use the word “branch” throughout, 
given that even most subsidiaries in the proper sense that we have come across and included in 
our sample, are both small relative to the parent bank and overcapitalized.) Opposite to contagion 
is diversification, when funds are moved to well-performing branches from less successful ones in 
accordance with the usual logic of portfolio optimization. The analysis is conducted both 
theoretically and empirically. 
We propose a model that highlights the interplay of the home country (where the parent bank is 
incorporated), the host country (where the branch operates) and bank-specific ingredients in the 
optimal lending volume selection. Two distinct features of a bank as opposed to other types of 
international investors are taken to be responsible for specific features of loan provision in an 
MNB branch: liquidity-sensitivity in the face of uncertain leverage provided by depositors and 
delegation to a local manager with non-transferable ability to earn interest on host country loans. 
The model shows that both delegation and liquidity-sensitivity can give rise to lending contagion, 
depending on the covariances found in return statistics across the items appearing on the MNB 
balance sheet. 
The empirical part of the paper looks for evidence of cross border lending contagion in a 
comprehensive sample of multinational banks worldwide. This is done by means of several fixed 
effect panel regressions. The dependent variable in all cases is the annual growth of loans in a host 
country branch. The home and host country macro fundamentals (GDP growth, inflation and 
long-term interest rates) are among the explanatory variables. The list of the latter is completed 
with a home-host country bilateral exchange rate volatility measure and a measure of credit risk 
management costs in the parent bank. The exchange rate volatility proves to be most important in 
all specifications of the empirical model. This fact is easily explainable by the contribution 
exchange rate uncertainty makes to mutual correlations of the foreign branch balance sheet 
realizations, seen from the parent bank viewpoint. 
Altogether, although we have found both types of MNB lending behavior, i.e. diversification and 
contagion, in our sample of banks, the contagion effect dominates. And the geographical location 
of the branch seems to play a role in this phenomenon. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   3 
 
1. Introduction 
Do internationally active banks adjust their lending portfolios across countries in accordance with 
conventional risk/return considerations? Or is there a different mechanism which makes the bank 
behave more like an octopus, which normally spreads out more than one tentacle when on the 
move. It also withdraws not just one hit tentacle, but all of them at once, when reacting to an 
outside shock. The answer is highly important if one wishes to assess the impact of loan quality 
changes in one country on credit creation in another. In particular, one could be better able to 
decide whether the consequences of a shock in one country on the real sector financing in another 
are different in economies with a high degree of foreign-bank penetration. One is inclined to 
believe that multinational banks provide an additional credit shock transmission medium beyond 
the standard financial markets, which fact could be an issue of concern for bank regulators. In 
short, the mentioned questions, besides the associated theoretical challenge, are of great practical 
importance for economies that are financially integrated with larger, external ones. 
Branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks are visible in the financial sectors of most 
industrialized economies. This paper does not study the reasons for foreign bank penetration, 
asking instead about the factors behind the expansion or contraction of a particular bank’s 
operation in a given host country. 
Standard portfolio-optimization theory derives wealth allocation across assets and their pricing 
from statistics of exogenous random factors. If a structural-uncertainty parameter of an economy 
changes, investor portfolios are shifted to reflect the new equilibrium prices of risk. Thus, if an 
international investor decides between assets in two different countries, a shock––either positive 
or negative––to the asset-return pattern in one country usually calls for wealth reallocation across 
countries. This is the usual consequence of diversification of an international portfolio. However, 
it often happens that a multinational bank cross-subsidizes between controlled units in different 
countries in reaction to changes in loan quality in one country unit. For an outside observer, the 
effect looks like cross-border contagion between lending volumes. This contagion can be both 
positive (lending increases everywhere when important divisions do well) and negative (less is 
lent everywhere although loan quality has deteriorated in just one country division). We find 
diversification as well as contagion to be systematically present in multinational bank behavior. In 
the theoretical part of the paper, we show that both effects can be a consequence of fully rational 
behavior (and not just boundedly rational aberration, as the first impression might suggest). In the 
empirical part, we establish the relative extent of lending contagion vs. diversification in a large 
sample of multinational banks in industrial countries. 
Our theoretical arguments are applicable to both standard organizational forms of foreign-bank 
presence, branches and subsidiaries. Nevertheless, for our purposes it is easier to think of the 
foreign bank operating in an open economy in branch form, that is, without separate capital 
requirements and with a centralized alternative to localized management. In this way, we 
acknowledge two stylized facts visible in foreign-owned bank activities in many economies: 
overcapitalization (i.e., slack regulatory capital constraints) and a gradually increasing weight of 
branch-based presence. Both observations indicate that the legal structure may not be the prime 
factor of relevance. Accordingly, our analysis can be considered complementary to those papers 
directly addressing the organizational-form aspects of bank risks (Calzolari and Lóránth 2004, 
Dermine 2003, Lóránth and Morrison 2003). 4   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
The multinational bank (MNB) that we have in mind faces fundamental market imperfections 
caused by the fact that it is a bank and not a textbook international investor in a frictionless 
market. What makes it different is the presence of twin principle-agent phenomena. One is 
between the bank manager and the borrower, in which the manager is the principal; the other is 
between the shareholder and the manager, in which the manager is the agent. These make up the 
core of the banking business according to the theory developed by Diamond (1984) and Diamond 
and Rajan (2000, 2001). We formulate a “reduced-form” model of an MNB which delegates the 
operation of a foreign branch to a local manager. Delegation is optimal because the manager 
possesses specific, non-transferable human capital that allows him to collect debt better than an 
outside creditor. The agency-theoretic background of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) is 
implicit, meaning that the principal-agent aspects of manager-shareholder and manager-borrower 
interactions are present backstage. Specifically, we do not elaborate on the reasons a bank takes 
deposits (thereby overcoming the hold-up problem in the Diamond-Rajan theory), taking this 
feature as given. Nevertheless, we do include a solvency constraint that stems from this bank-
specific form of leverage. 
In a more detailed model of the above category, delegation would be optimal because the manager 
would possess specific, non-transferable human capital allowing him to collect debt better than an 
outside creditor. The extent to which this managerial human capital is being employed 
corresponds to the degree to which relationship-banking features prevail in the economy. At the 
same time, a bank is able to attract deposits––and therewith extend the scale of its operation 
beyond the limits of its own available funds––only because the rents from improved debt 
collection are not entirely appropriated by the managers themselves. Part is turned over to the 
shareholders and depositors, since the former have the ability to audit the manager-run bank, 
reducing the manager’s exclusive control over the proceeds from the loan portfolio. At the same 
time, the depositors’ position allows them to threaten the shareholders and managers with a run on 
the bank if an audit is not carried out and the human capital not supplied, as such would imply that 
the resulting revenues are insufficient to repay depositors’ claims. In this way, the depositors 
ensure that the shareholders credibly commit to audit the managers and the latter commit to 
monitor the borrowers. Accordingly, one is able to explain why banks usually prefer deposits to 
other forms of external finance, such as equity. 
We want to know what happens to the provision of credit by the bank branch in one country if an 
exogenous shock to real economic activity occurs in the other. Specifically, what is specific about 
an MNB’s behavior as compared to a multinational investor who is not a bank but an international 
portfolio optimizer handling all assets at arm’s length? 
Given the focus of this paper on the credit-creation aspects of the banking industry, explicit 
coverage of bank failure and closure alternatives is not essential. Hence, there are no bankruptcies 
in our model. Otherwise, after a formal description of bank asset and liability transformation 
under bankruptcy, one would have to conduct the very same analysis of deposit collection and 
lending under the new owners and managers. Therefore, we model banks and bank managers 
whose preferences only include termination of activity for reason of a depositor run or a 
regulatory action as a latent threat. 
The agency mechanism that influences lending behavior sensitivity to other country variables in 
our model works through the fee that a manager obtains for employing his specific human capital. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   5 
 
This fee appropriates (most of) the surplus from the earnings the manager delivers in excess of 
what the bank shareholder could do by direct involvement in the branch. Since the shareholder’s 
arm’s length returns might have non-zero correlations across countries (e.g. due to common noise 
components, exchange rate volatility, etc.), the branch manager’s lending decisions, to the extent 
they are made to maximize the fee, are also influenced by variables outside his country of 
operation. In this way, both cross-border diversification and contagion can emerge, depending on 
the joint statistics of returns. The manager’s actions confined to one country must take into 
account the MNB’s performance in all other countries. For example, assume the shareholder 
extracts higher/lower returns under an arm’s length operation abroad at the same time as at home, 
whereas the hired manager’s performance in the foreign branch is completely independent of the 
parent bank’s performance. Then, in the “low return state of nature”, the shareholder earns less 
abroad in net terms due to a high fee paid to the manager. The foreign branch may then obtain a 
low budget. Therefore, in this state of nature, a loan volume reduction both at home and abroad is 
likely and lending contagion occurs.
1 
The analysis confirms the existence of both qualitative and quantitative differences between 
responses to shocks abroad by the bank dependent on manager human capital and the arm’s-
length lender. Our main findings are as follows: 
1.  Both lending contagion and diversification are fully rational behavioral patterns. 
2.  When a standard international portfolio optimizer would diversify (i.e., shift funds to other 
country branches) in response to a country-specific shock to the return on loans, a bank with 
delegated branch management might be susceptible to lending contagion, depending on the 
statistics of manager-specific earning ability. 
3.  If the loan portfolio performance implications of delegation are weak, lending contagion can 
still take place in banks with tight liquidity constraints; this precautionary motive for 
octopusian behavior can be present under particular cross-asset covariance structures of the 
bank balance sheet. 
4.  Empirically, more than one-half of multinational banks with at least one foreign branch of 
non-negligible weight, show signs of lending contagion. From the regional point of view, 
most contagion is found in European multinational banks with significant cross-border 
penetration into new EU member states from Central Europe. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review. Section 3 
introduces the model. Section 4 presents the main empirical results of a panel regression of 
multinational bank lending, concerning the reaction of foreign branches to domestic and foreign 
shocks. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The existing literature on the relations between bank organizational structure, management 
incentives, and credit policies is strongly influenced by the work of Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1993). These authors created a model that accommodated the roles of shareholder, depositor, and 
regulator. The principal conclusion is that regulation exists because small, dispersed claim holders 
on a bank (i.e., the depositors) are unable to coordinate their effort well enough to enforce 
                                                           
1 We are grateful to Falko Fecht for suggesting this example. 6   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
adequate management decisions. However, the approach of Dewatripont and Tirole is not bank 
specific (i.e., it can be equally applied to any profit-seeking enterprise with decisions delegated to 
managers). The literature directly addressing the special role of banks exploits the information 
asymmetry between entrepreneur and investor. Diamond (1984) explains the existence of banks 
via their role as delegated monitors of risky investment. This idea was further developed to 
explain the necessity of financial intermediaries in the form of banks in an environment where not 
just entrepreneurial effort but also the effort given to its monitoring is partially unobservable (see 
Diamond and Rajan 2000). Besides that, the systemic specificity of banks and other credit 
institutions from the macroeconomic point of view requires a structured analysis of bank 
financing and investment decisions. A widely recognized unified approach to capital budgeting by 
financial institutions was offered by Froot and Stein (1998).  
The latter paper, although it does not deal with multinational banking directly, contains a number 
of tangency points with our modeling approach. For instance, one can draw parallels between 
Froot and Stein’s (1998) projects in which a bank invests, and branches to which an MNB 
allocates budget. Both models work with concave preferences over the bank’s end of period 
wealth, cost of finance (capital and external funds such as deposits), as well as non-diversifiable 
earnings risks. Froot and Stein (1998) carry their analysis to the point of showing that the bank-
wide risk aversion (a function of the balance sheet) co-determines the value of, and budget 
allocation to, individual non-tradable investment projects in its portfolio. We go much farther than 
that, by tracing budget allocation across branches directly to the interplay of delegation and risk-
management factors in an MNB. Additionally, we are able to make predictions about the lending 
decisions of branches after the parent bank budget has been decided upon. Nevertheless, the 
message of both models can be expressed in terms of bank-internal capital market operation. 
The existing models of bank risk management often make use of an advanced form of information 
asymmetry called “capture” (see, e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004). “Borrower capture” 
means the inability of a finance-seeking entrepreneur to communicate project-quality information 
credibly to anyone but the “house bank.” Similarly, “intermediary capture” occurs if a bank 
seeking to attract depositors and outside equity providers is unable to credibly communicate the 
quality of its investment portfolio to anyone but the incumbent majority shareholder. Sometimes, 
the existence of capture in theoretical models leads to surprising results when the interplay with 
regulatory policies is considered. (For instance, bank-share ownership can become more risky as a 
result of tightening capital requirements, as in the model by Morrison and White (2004). This 
paper adds another element––the regulator’s own reputation and its significance for the 
equilibrium resource allocation in the financial-services market––to the discussion.) An important 
object of study is the probability of a depositor run or bank failure (or, more generally, the 
occurrence of financial crises) in a dynamic perspective. These models are concerned with the 
long-term sustainability of loan and deposit markets rather than the outcome of a single strategic 
encounter between financial-service providers and suppliers. In this vein, Repullo (2004) studies 
the existence of “prudent” versus “gambling” equilibria as a function of regulatory requirements 
and the impact on the credit conditions. Another recent contribution to this line of literature is 
Monnet and Quintin (2004), in which not just the current state but also the historical path of the 
financial markets determines their size and structure in the next period. 
The extension of the discussed framework to multinational banks, as in Külpmann (2000), 
involves deepening the analysis to the level of individual divisions (branches) and their managers’ Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   7 
 
optimal choices within a multinational bank. Alternatively, Chan-Lau and Chen (2002) derive a 
dependence of the financial crisis (a reversal in the credit supply) in an open economy on the 
extent of frictions in the financial sector relative to the economic fundamentals. These and related 
papers assume that international asset diversification is an important motive in multinational-bank 
decision making, which has long been recognized in the literature on international finance (see, 
e.g., Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994)). Altogether, the number of contributions to the theoretical 
literature on international bank behavior has so far been relatively small. 
The specific topic of foreign-bank presence in the CEE region was covered by two empirical 
studies by de Haas and van Lelyveld (2003, 2004), which use Bank for International Settlements 
and BankScope statistics ending in 2000. Building on earlier empirical literature mainly 
concerned with Latin America, these reports distinguish between the “pull factor” and the “push 
factor” associated with foreign-bank penetration. The former corresponds to the reduction in 
credit by foreign banks in reaction to economic downturns and financial crises in the host country 
(and its expansion during booms), while the latter deals with reaction to the home-country 
situation of the parent bank. There is a positive push effect when home-country disturbances 
result in a credit contraction by foreign units (the parent bank is concerned with balance-sheet 
repair). A negative push factor is present when home difficulties lead foreign units to lend more 
(the parent bank follows the standard portfolio-diversification logic). For the CEE region, de Haas 
and van Lelyveld find that the pull factor is absent: foreign banks did not cut credit during host-
country troubles. On the other hand, they do find a negative push effect: there is a significant 
negative relationship between home-country economic growth and host-country credit by foreign 
banks. This finding is supported by informal evidence from other sources. Given that the 
workings of the push factor have implications for both macroeconomic and financial stability, the 
model to be developed here will be used primarily to study the spillover of home-country shocks 
through dependent bank units in the host country. 
The newest paper by de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006)––to be referred to as HaasLel06 below––
extends the perspective of their earlier studies to multinational banks on a global scale. There are 
clear affinities between HaasLel06 and our paper both in the object of interest (determinants of 
lending behavior of MNB subsidiaries), the data used (bank-level financial characteristics taken 
from BankScope, and home and host country economic fundamentals) and the econometric 
techniques applied (fixed effect panel regression). Similarly to our search for diversification vs. 
contagion, HaasLel06 look for substitution (from weak to strong) vs. support (of the weak by the 
strong) in lending patterns across subsidiaries. However, besides partial methodological 
differences from HaasLel06, our approach contains a number of substantially distinctive features. 
First, we concentrate on banks in OECD countries only, following the conjecture that MNB 
penetration into developing countries happens on the basis of a different set of criteria and 
decision patterns (among other things, lending revenue assessment and credit risk management 
call for less standard procedures than those applicable in legally stable developed economies). 
Therefore, parent banks that only expanded into emerging countries are not present in our sample. 
Second, we come up with an explicit decision-theoretic foundation for the MNB-internal capital 
market which rationalizes both diversification and contagion (and would equally well rationalize 
substitution and support if we moved the focus from the parent-subsidiary to the subsidiary-
subsidiary shock transmission channel in accordance with the HaasLel06 vantage point). Third, 
we take into account the inevitable structural changes in any MNB if followed for too many years. 
Specifically, not a single MNB in the HaasLel06 sample can be claimed to have existed 8   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
unchanged, without at least one major reorganization, during the 1992–2004 time span that they 
chose. On the contrary, we have chosen the temporal dimension of our panel that captures the 
most recent stable state of the MNB landscape in industrialized countries. This has resulted in a 
sample covering the years 1999–2003. Fourth, we acted on the assumption (strongly confirmed by 
the outcome) that exchange rate volatility, completely left out in HaasLel06, should be an 
important summary statistic for many cross-border frictions that influence fund flows from the 
center to dependent units in an MNB. 
Recently, international bank-regulation issues have also received attention. Holthausen and Rønde 
(2004) study the impact of home- and host-country supervisor information exchange on bank-
closure decisions. Lóránth and Morrison (2003) examine the role of national deposit insurance 
and evaluate its impact on the decision making of multinational banks. They also link the result 
about cross-border investment choices to the existence of a multinational bank channel for 
financial contagion. Calzolari and Lóránth (2004) extend the analysis to include a welfare-
optimizing regulator and show how the regulatory stance is influenced by the chosen 
representative form (branch vs. subsidiary) of the foreign bank. Morrison and White (2004) 
endow the regulator with an additional ability (besides bank-licensing and capital-adequacy 
requirements)––asset auditing––and examine the impact of this additional tool on the phenomena 
of adverse selection and moral hazard in the banking sector. Their model allows for multiple 
equilibria, some of which entail a crisis of confidence in the banking sector and a corresponding 
welfare-reducing decrease in project financing. 
Although we do not model the regulator explicitly, the problems discussed in this last strain of 
literature have a direct bearing on this paper. By focusing on risk grouping in accordance with the 
country of origin, we are able to concentrate the analysis on international financial intermediaries 
co-existing with national regulators. In our approach, the capture effect is studied as a friction 
between entrepreneurs, banks, and investors of individual countries. One of the consequences of 
our model is a case for a regulatory policy that facilitates the bank portfolio audit for shareholders 
and depositors. In this way, the domestic banking regulator may support an equilibrium with a 
high degree of specific manager human capital in multinational bank branches under its 
jurisdiction. Suppose there is a sudden reversal in the credit-creation process owing to a real or 
financial disturbance in the home country of the parent bank. If too many host-country borrowers 
depend on loans from the foreign-controlled bank, this reversal will have a macro-impact, with 
possible subsequent implications for the financial health of the real sector, that is, financial 
stability. The domestic regulator is not in a position to change the behavior of the incumbent 
foreign-controlled bank. However, a proper regulatory stance can encourage the entry of other 
banks able to provide the missing funds. In this respect, we suggest that one key criterion of 
supervisory policies is their ability to reduce bank managers’ monitoring costs. 
3.  A Model of a Multinational Bank with Delegated Foreign Branch 
Management 
There are two countries in our model, which we call home and host. A multinational bank has its 
headquarters in the home country, whose unit of account is the global numéraire (we think of the 
home country as representing a big economy). The bank has a branch in the host country. There is 
one general investment opportunity (global portfolio) and another opportunity to grant non-traded Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   9 
 
loans in each of the two countries. There is also a risk-free money-market deposit opportunity in 
each country. The bank is owned by a representative shareholder, who has C units of capital to 
invest. She can, in addition to investing her own funds in either of these assets, collect deposits 
from the public. Each branch covers with its services a specific segment of the deposit market 
within the country, and attracts a fixed amount of deposits. Let the volume of deposits be D in the 
home country (in global units) and d in the host country (in its own units of account). Some 
deposits may be withdrawn upon the payment of interest due to an unspecified liquidity shock. 
To perform the loan and deposit business, the shareholder usually hires a manager for the foreign 
branch. The branch manager possesses an endowment of non-transferable human capital, allowing 
him to collect a rate of return on the loans in excess of the baseline arm’s-length rate that can be 
extracted from the same borrowers by an outside investor in the market. He is remunerated by a 
fee paid out of the branch’s proceeds. 
There are two periods, the first when the capital allocation, deposit collection, and lending takes 
place, and the second when returns are realized and interest and fees paid. The shareholder is a 
risk-averse expected-utility maximizer. The uncertainties at date 0 exist with regard to six 
variables, three in each country: return on loans, return on outside assets (exchange-rate adjusted 
in the case of the host country), and deposit/withdrawal rate. 
3.1 Bank Balance Sheet and Cash Flows 
The general notational convention to be employed throughout the paper is the use of upper-case 
letters for the home-country variables and lower-case letters for the host country ones. 
Let B, D, X
0, and X be, respectively, shareholder own funds (capital), deposits, cash holdings, and 
loans granted, for the home-country branch. B is a portion of the total investment funds C. That is, 
if A denotes funds invested in alternative assets, and b the budget of the foreign country branch, 
then  C=A+B+b. Therefore, the rate of return, R
A, on outside global assets A=C-B-b can be 
regarded as the opportunity cost of bank capital. The interest rate on deposits is R
D, and the 
random deposit/withdrawal rate at date 1 is V. Cash earns the risk-free money-market rate of 
return, R
0, whereas loans earn a risky rate of return R
L. The same lower-case symbols denote the 
corresponding values for the foreign country. 
The period-1 domestic disposable wealth or funds of the bank shareholder net of the opportunity 
cost of capital are equal to: 
 
) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 0 A D L R B V R D R X R X W + − + − + + + = . 










0 be, respectively, the excess returns on loans, deposits, 
and outside assets over the risk-free rate.
2 Given the home branch balance-sheet identity 
B+D=X
0+X, the expression for domestic branch disposable funds can be rewritten as: 
                                                           
2 If all deposits were claimed back at date 1, we would have V=1 and Y
D=R
0-R
D. However, we should think of a 
typical case where only a fraction of deposits is withdrawn and, accordingly, V is a random variable distributed 
around a mean value substantially below unity. 10   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
 
A D L BY DY XY W − + = .                                                  (1) 
 
Analogously, let b be the capital allocated to the foreign branch. The disposable funds of the 
foreign branch in period 1 are given by  ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 0 a d l r b v r d r x r x w + − + − + + + = , where 
r
a is the return on outside assets recalculated in the host country currency. By defining excess 
returns in the same way as for the home country, we get 
 
a d l by dy xy w − + = .                                                         (2) 
 
Note that equation (2) is in the host country units. To keep the model complexity under control, 
we do not model exchange rate risks in detail. Instead, we simply assume that the shareholder’s 
gross funds at date 1 coming from both bank branches are W
S=W+(1+τ)w, where τ is the rate of 
host country currency appreciation between periods 0 and 1. From this, we shall subtract the 







a to denote the excess returns in the home country units, we can summarize the period-1 
funds of the shareholder by the expression 
 
f R C by dy xy BY DY XY Q
A a d l A D L − + + − + + − + = ) 1 (
* * * .   (3) 
 
Note that Q differs by the amount D+(1+τ)d from the expression for the bank’s end-of-period-1 
earnings. Since the bank’s control of the deposits not withdrawn in period 1, unless there is a 
failure, continues into further periods, quantity Q––and not the earnings––serves as a measure of 
solvency. This is also the quantity over which bank shareholder preferences will be formed. 







are jointly normally distributed.
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T. The covariance matrix of ε will be denoted by Ω. 
3.2 Shareholder Preferences 
In view of Assumption 1, the level of bank funds Q as seen in period 0 is a normally distributed 
random variable. Let us denote the mean and variance of Q by, respectively, µQ and 
2
Q σ . Clearly, 
 
f Z r C bz dz xz BZ DZ XZ
A a d l A D L
Q − + + + − + + − + = ) 1 (
0 * * * µ , 
 
                                                           




*l would not be the most natural assumption. However, a more realistic representation of the 
exchange rate risks would lead to more complex calculations without affecting the qualitative implications of the 
model. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   11 
 
and  ε ε σ ⋅ Ω ⋅ =
T
Q
2 . If Q falls below a given threshold Q
0, the bank fails (which can mean a 
depositor run, forced administration or other forms of activity termination and removal of 
shareholder rights), and the shareholder’s funds are reduced to zero. In our model, disposable 
funds fall below Q
0 when earnings from loans and alternative assets are insufficient to compensate 
for the withdrawal of deposits. Thus, failure is a consequence of illiquidity. 
The bank shareholder has negative exponential utility U with absolute risk aversion parameter γ 
over future realizations of random variable Q, defined as controlled funds Q if Q≥Q
0 and zero 
otherwise. Formally, we have the expected utility equal to 
 




Q e e E U
≥
− − − =
Q
Q 1
γ γ . 
    
Symbol  {}
0 Q ≥ Q 1  stands for the indicator random variable of the event { }
0 Q Q ≥ . The constant term 
exp(-γQ
0) normalizes the utility at failure to zero. Negative exponential utility has been selected 
for the sake of explicitness and ease of computation, although qualitatively similar results––albeit 
with a messier algebra––are obtainable for more general forms of the utility function. 
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and N is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. SEQ is the well-known expression 
for the certainty-equivalent of normally distributed wealth Q under absolute risk aversion γ. 
The risk-aversion assumption for the bank shareholder is used to generate non-trivial demands for 
different assets and allows one to analyze portfolio shifts in response to shocks. For the same 
reason, the asset returns contain random noises even though the latter are unaffected by the degree 
of relationship banking, that is, they are seemingly unrelated to the central object of our interest. 
All the same, non-zero variances are needed in the present setting to prevent the problem from 
becoming vacuous. 
We have chosen to express the “risk-adjusted distance from failure” T of the bank through the 
balance sheet (“accounting”) liquidity variable Q. Naturally, from the regulatory perspective, the 
actual propensity to fail would be better captured by a capital adequacy measure. On the contrary, 
bank runs by depositors are often triggered by actual or perceived illiquidity. One could imagine 
setting up a formal mechanism in the model which would connect both aspects. However, we 
have opted for simplicity and analytical tractability to the detriment of realism in our definition of 
the failure threshold. Qualitatively, for the big and well-established international banks we 
consider, capital adequacy is not a direct issue of concern, although varying levels of internally 12   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
measured accounting liquidity might have an impact on budgeting decisions. Altogether, we 
believe that the chosen distance-to-failure measure reflects the needed link from earnings to 
safety, and this is all that is required from the present model. 
The factor N(T) in (4) distinguishes the expected utility of a bank from that of a conventional 
mean/variance-optimizing investor. When T is sufficiently big, its value is close to unity and the 
bank shareholder’s preferences are almost the same as those of an unconstrained investor. As the 
critical value represented by T decreases, the banker’s expected utility gradually approaches zero. 
Under similar circumstances, a conventional certainty equivalent-maximizing investor utility 
would fall under zero. That is, in our model the Diamond-Rajan understanding of a bank as a 
financial institution with specific liquidity rules is reflected in the corrective term N(T) in an 
otherwise standard certainty-equivalent portfolio optimization problem. This definition mimics 
our stylized knowledge of the consequences of a regulatory intervention in a bank deemed 
illiquid: unless the depositors themselves initiate a bank run, the regulator removes the 
shareholders and uses available funds plus deposit insurance to compensate the depositors. 
Consequently, tight regulation or, more generally, high sensitivity to the pre-conceived distance-
to-failure (meaning high Q
0) actually creates a lower bound on the expected utility of the bank 
shareholder in this model. The banks for which value N(T) is significantly lower than one will be 
called liquidity-sensitive (LS). The opposite case, when N(T) is almost unity, will be dubbed 
liquidity-insensitive (LI). 
As mentioned in the introduction, we only consider multinational banks organized in a branch 
form, i.e., there are no a priori failure triggers based on a lower limit value of W or w separately. 
(Such a limit exists only for the bank as a whole.) Formally, the analysis of a subsidiary form 
would go along similar lines, but the expected utility derived by the shareholder from the random 
variable Q would have to be calculated differently. Qualitatively, the results of the analysis would 
not change. We maintain the branch understanding of the foreign unit operation in view of the 
empirically observed prevailing overcapitalization of foreign subsidiaries in our sample. 
3.3 Shareholder-Manager Interaction 
In the sequel, variables with tildes stand for the quantities generated by the shareholder in the 
hypothetical case when she chooses not to hire a local manager for the host country branch. 
If the loan portfolio represented by x were held by an outside investor without any particular 
knowledge of, or relationship with, the borrowers involved, the date-1 excess return on it would 
be 
s y ~  with mean z
s. This would also be the return attainable to the shareholder, had she decided 
to operate the branch at arm’s length. The branch manager can do better than that, which is 
reflected in the fact that his mean excess return z
*l is higher than  [ ]
s s z y E
* * ~ =  (here, exchange 
rate influences are included, so that all quantities are in the home country units).
4 Our concept of 
informational frictions in the loan market utilizes the effect of biased information (errors in the 
perceived mean values) rather than imprecise information (higher than efficient variances). 
                                                           
4 One can think of the “true” potential return on x as an unobservable value. By employing his human capital, the 
branch manager obtains a noisy signal about the potential return. The signal is biased, but the bias decreases with 
human capital. Note the difference of this interpretation and the one utilized by many microfinance models, 
where the signals are unbiased and only their precision varies. Our understanding is closer to the discrete version 
of Girsanov’s probability: better signals mean a more precise knowledge of the drift, whereas the diffusion 
magnitude stays the same. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   13 
 
If the manager is hired, he chooses the volume x of loans to be extended by the branch. The funds 
generated in period 1 are then given by (3). If the manager is not hired, the shareholder, by her 
direct engagement with the branch, can generate the period-1 funds equal to 
 
) 1 ( ~ ~ ~ * * * A a d s A D L R C by dy y x BY DY XY Q + + − + + − + = , 
 
Of course, the lending decision x ~  taken by the shareholder acting alone, as well as the foreign 
branch funds so attained, w ~ , would be different from the ones following from the manager’s 
decisions (plain symbols with no tildes). We shall call the hypothetical value x ~  the shareholder’s 
substitute lending choice, and the maximal utility thus attained her substitute utility. 
Concerning the interaction of substitute management uncertainties with the previously defined 
ones, we make an assumption similar to Assumption 1 above, with the same caveat regarding the 
exchange rate risks: 




* ~ ,  y*
d,  Y
A,  and  y*
a  are jointly normally 
distributed. 
 
  Accordingly, we define the vector of the shareholder’s substitute mean excess returns 
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T with the covariance matrix Ω ~ . 
Under the above assumption, the substitute utility of the shareholder is given by the expression 
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The shareholder-manager interaction in period 0 will be defined as a simultaneous-move game. 
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The shareholder determines the budget shares B and b available for both branches and the lending 
volume X in the home country branch, which we assume she manages directly.
5 For the (off-the-
equilibrium-path) case where the manager is not hired, she also selects the substitute loan volume 
x ~  in the foreign branch. (Recall that the deposit volumes D and d as well as the total funds 
available for investment in the MNB, C, are given exogenously.) The potential manager selects 
the fee for the use of his human capital in the host country branch. 
Thus, the strategy space of the shareholder is parameterized by the vector 
[ ] [] b B X x I x I
S − − = = , , , ~ , ~ ~ , whereas that of the manager is parameterized by the scalar f. 
We associate the manager’s special skills with his knowledge about the repayment ability of the 
set of borrowers that comprise the loan portfolio of the branch. Put differently, managers have an 
enhanced ability to collect on debt because they act in a relationship-banking environment. In 
such a case, their ability to extract rents is substantial, which is reflected in the following 
assumption. 
Assumption 3 The host country branch manager has full bargaining power over the parent bank 
shareholder. Therefore, he is able to negotiate a fee such that the shareholder’s utility achieved 
with the help of his services is equal to her substitute utility plus one cent. In other words, the 
shareholder is indifferent between keeping and dismissing the manager who receives fee f. 
Any fee higher than the one defined in Assumption 3 would see the manager dismissed, since the 
shareholder would do better acting in his place herself. A lower fee would be suboptimal for the 
manager unless he was exposed to competition from others with human capital linked to the same 
loan portfolio, which is highly improbable. Altogether, Assumption 3 is just one of the many 
existing ways to describe the shareholder-manager negotiation outcome, and was chosen for its 
computational tractability.
6 
Assumption 3 means that the equilibrium fee which the manager is able to negotiate is implicitly 
characterized by the equality 
 
( ) ) ~ ( ~ , , I U f I x U
S = .       ( 6 )  
 
The solution for  () I x F f ~ , =  following from the Implicit Function Theorem is unique due to 
strict concavity of the utility functions U and U ~ . Naturally, of all the combinations (x,f) that 
satisfy (6), the manager chooses the one with the highest f. 
 
                                                           
5 This assumption is not central to the analysis, but considerably simplifies the calculations. The generic case that 
we have in mind is of a bank which is well established at home but is also engaged in more recent activity 
abroad. So, its lending in the home country will be considered the core business under full shareholder control, 
relative to which the foreign activities are tailored. 
6 For instance, in Diamond and Rajan, 2000, the bargaining power is split at random between the shareholder and 
the manager, each of them given, with probability ½, the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other. In 
this paper, we do not explore the potential game-theoretic ramifications of the manager-shareholder relation any 
further. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   15 
 
We are now able to define the equilibrium outcome of the shareholder-manager bargaining game 






T in which, given the 
levels I
0=[D,d,C]
T of exogenous balance sheet items, 
x maximizes the manager’s fee defined by condition (6), given the shareholder’s choice of I
S 
[] []
T T S b B X x I x I − − = = , , , ~ , ~ ~  maximizes the shareholder’s substitute expected utility. 
 
The shareholder, knowing that she will effectively earn substitute utility U ~  anyway, decides 
rationally upon the X-,  x ~ -, B-, and b-levels as if counting on the negative negotiation outcome 
with the manager, meaning that she selects I ~ which maximizes U ~ . Clearly, I ~ does not depend 








 for the optimal choice. 
 
The selection of x by the manager is made so that  ( ) I x F f ~ , =  is maximized given I ~. Since fee 
negotiation results in (6) for any choices of x, (6) is an identity along the x-dimension. By taking 


















Thanks to strict concavity of U, F has a single maximum w.r.t. x for every value of I ~, and this 





. Thus, the usual Envelope Theorem 





 in equilibrium. As will become clear from the results of 
the next subsection, given the equilibrium choice of I ~, the manager’s choice of x is also utility-
maximizing for the bank shareholder as long as the bank is not too close to failure.
7 The above 
arguments can be summarized as 
 
Proposition 1 For sufficiently liquid banks (meaning that the distance to failure T is big enough 
so that shareholder utility U is growing in the mean µQ of disposable wealth and decreasing in its 
variance 
2
Q σ ), the manager’s equilibrium choice of lending volume in the foreign branch 
                                                           
7 Observe that the choice of x on the level which optimizes the shareholder utility is not an ex ante commitment 
by the branch manager, but a consequence of his own optimizing behavior. Formally, this exact result obtains 
only when the manager has full bargaining power. Were the bargaining power split between the shareholder and 
the manager, x would be described by a more complex set of conditions, even though qualitatively it would be a 
function of the same variables and, for a broad class of specifications, the dependences would have the same 
signs. Our chosen specification has the advantage of producing easier formulae. More generally, it allows us to 
avoid detailed treatment of the manager’s hidden actions (including loan volume choice), unobserved effort (use 
of human capital) and other attributes of principal-agent modeling. 16   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
maximizes the shareholder’s utility given her equilibrium substitute choice of portfolio. The 






We will make the notion of “being not too close to failure” more precise in the next subsection. 
 
3.4 Optimal lending 
Manager’s choice 
Condition (6) defines the fee f implicitly as a function of the manager’s own loan volume choice x 
and the vector of the shareholder’s substitute portfolio holdings J ~ =[X,D,-B,x ~ ,d,-b,C]
T. As was 
argued in the previous subsection, in the range of bank wealth values relevant for our analysis 
(i.e., not too close to failure) both x and J ~  are given by internal solutions to the manager’s and 
the shareholder’s optimization problems, respectively. In other words, they satisfy the first order 
conditions of optimality.  
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An interpretation of K and L, as well as analogous functions that will appear in subsequent results, 
can be given as follows. Formally, if one considers m=µQ and v=
2
Q σ  as independent variables and 




















γ . That is, the values of K and L express the sensitivities of the utility to, 
respectively, the variance and the mean of the uncertain bank funds Q. 
It turns out that the shareholder’s preferences become perverse in the proximity of the failure 
trigger. Namely, for too small values of the distance to failure T, the utility is increasing in the 
variance variable (i.e., K<0); it can also become marginally decreasing in the mean wealth 
variable (L<0). An example is given in Fig. 1. The reason is the existence of the cut-off value of Q 
below which the outside utility of zero is guaranteed. As is usual under such circumstances, in the 
neighborhood of this cut-off value, the shareholder prefers high-risk gambles and may even prefer 
failure to continuation with a tiny positive mean wealth. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   17 
 













Note: The graph shows the dependence of K and L on T for the risk aversion parameter γ=1.5 and 
wealth standard deviation σ=0.5. 
 
Obviously, we are only interested in the results in the regular region of the values of T, where the 
shareholder prefers higher mean wealth to lower and is genuinely risk-averse. Therefore, “not too 
close to failure” will mean the requirement of positive K and L. In the example shown in Fig. 1 
this would mean a distance to failure above the level of 1.3. 
The manager’s optimal choice of x can be characterized by the following result, obtainable 
directly by calculating the partial x-derivative of (4). 
Lemma 1 If the bank is sufficiently far away from failure (meaning that (4) has an internal 
maximum with respect to portfolio choices J), then the optimal lending volume selected by the 
foreign branch manager is characterized by 
 
l x Lz J K
* = Ω γ ,       (7) 
 
where Ω
x is the row of Ω corresponding to component x of J. 
Condition (7) follows from the equality 
( ) J K Lz e
x
U x l SEQ Ω − =
∂
∂ − γ
γ * . 
 
A special case of (7) holds for an LI-bank (e.g. when the failure threshold Q
0 is sufficiently low). 
Then the ratio L/K would be almost unity and (7) would correspond to optimizing the certainty 
equivalence SEQ with respect to x, as with any other liquidity-unconstrained optimizing investor. 
This is an immediate consequence of the standard negative exponential utility maximization 
results. 18   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
The ultimate objective of the conducted formal analysis is to calculate the impact on host country 
branch lending x of the change in the home country mean loan returns Z
L. Therefore, the next step 
is to calculate the sensitivity of condition (7) to the change in Z
L. To formulate the result, we need 
to split the covariance matrix Ω into blocks corresponding to the partition [I,I
0]
T of J into 














We denote by ω
x the row of ω corresponding to component x of I. 
The formal statement regarding the whole vector I, obtained by differentiating (7) w.r.t. Z
L, is 
given by 
Lemma 2 The partial derivative w.r.t. Z
L of the portfolio decisions of the international bank with 































































x ω′  is the row vector of covariances between ε
*l and the 









 requires a similar result for the substitute portfolio decision  [ ]
T S I x I , ~ ~ =  of the shareholder 







). So, we next need to analyze 
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The vector of mean returns of the four assets whose holdings the shareholder selects in her 
substitute problem, is equal to  []
T a A L s z Z Z z R
* * , , , ~ ~ − − = . We also need to introduce the partition 










= Ω T ~
~ ~ ~ ω
. 
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Now, proceeding in the same way as when deriving the result of Lemma 1 (i.e., differentiating U ~  
in (5) with respect to each component of the decision vector I ~ of the shareholder), we establish 
the following characterization of optimal I ~. 
Lemma 3 If the bank is sufficiently far away from failure, then the optimal substitute portfolio 
choice of the shareholder is characterized by 
 
( ) R L I I K ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 = ⋅ Ψ + ⋅ ω γ .      (9) 
 
Equation (9) can be differentiated w.r.t. Z
L in order to establish the sensitivity of the shareholder’s 








. Note that vector R ~ on the right hand side of (9) contains Z
L as one of the 
components, so that the equation corresponding to (8) of Lemma 2 will have an extra term. The 
exact result is as follows. 
 
Lemma 4 The partial derivative w.r.t. Z
L of the substitute portfolio decisions of the international 
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ω γ .   (10) 
 
In the above equation, 1
X denotes a 4-dimensional column vector with coordinate X equal to unity 
and the remaining components equal to zero. 
 
To formulate the final result of this section, we need to separate from vector equation (10) the 
components corresponding to I
S. More precisely, assume that the covariance matrix ω ~ is non-
singular (this is paramount to saying that none of the assets under consideration is redundant) and 
put 
1 ~ ~ − = Ξ ω . Matrix Ξ ~  will be partitioned so as to separate the x-row and the X-column (or the 

























































































.  (11) 
 
Now, substituting (11) into (8) and rearranging terms, we arrive at the following result. 
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Proposition 2 If the multinational bank with delegated management of the foreign branch is 
sufficiently far away from failure, then the lending volume of that branch reacts to changes in the 
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To obtain an idea of the importance of the last two terms on the right hand side of (12), which 
appear there due to the precautionary behavior of both the branch manager and the shareholder, let 
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or a similar one, calculated with substitute variables. This multiplier is positive in the range of 
relevant values of T (i.e., those corresponding to a sufficient distance from failure, that is, for 
which K>0, L>0). It grows rapidly to plus infinity as K declines (i.e., as the bank becomes less 
sensitive to wealth variability) and also falls rapidly to zero as the bank becomes liquidity-
insensitive (i.e., T grows to infinity). Naturally, our analysis of the precautionary motives behind 
lending contagion behavior only makes sense in the intermediate region of distance to failure 
values. Fig. 2 below illustrates the behavior of the “precautionary factor” Π for a range of   
T-values between 2 and 5. 
 















Note: The graph shows the dependence of Π on T for the risk aversion parameter γ=1.5 and wealth 
standard deviation σ=0.5, the same as Fig. 1. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   21 
 
As illustrated by Fig. 2, the magnitude of the precautionary motives behind the reaction of the 
branch loan volume x to Z
L-changes diminishes with growing T. Therefore, an important special 
case of the previous proposition is an LI-bank. Recall that we have defined this in 2.2 as a bank 
with a sufficiently slack solvency constraint, i.e., one in which the risk-adjusted distances from 
failure T and T ~  are both big enough. Then, the last two terms on the right hand side of (12) 
become very small, whereas functions K, L,  K ~ and L ~  all get close to either γN(T) or  ) ~ (T N γ . We 
can then state the special case of Proposition 2 as 
Corollary 1 As the solvency constraint of the multinational bank with delegated management of 
the foreign branch becomes more slack (quantities T and T ~  grow towards infinity), the reaction 
of the lending volume by the foreign branch to the parent bank home country mean return on 









′ ⋅ ′ − ≈
∂
∂ ~ 1
2 .       ( 1 3 )  
 
In the LI-bank case covered by Corollary 1, the presence of contagion from home to host country 
branch lending is determined by the covariance structure of the relevant returns within and across 
countries. What distinguishes the bank with branch management delegation from financial 
companies operating on the arm’s length principle is the dependence of the risk transmission 
coefficient on both manager-generated and substitute covariances. More on interpretation of the 
results follows. 
3.5 Discussion 
We have characterized a multinational bank as a two-branch investor with two specific features: 
delegation of the foreign branch management and preference-sensitivity to an illiquidity threshold. 
Accordingly, the contagion in the lending decisions by branches can be related to either or both of 
these features. Altogether, depending on the presence of delegation/arm’s length management in 
an LI/LS-bank, there are four cases to distinguish. We comment on the pre-conditions for 
contagion in all four cases in turn. 
Benchmark: arm’s length LI-bank (no delegation, T=∞) 
The portfolio choice of such a bank and the foreign branch lending response to Z
L-changes follow 
as a special case from expression (9). When both bank branches are run directly by the 





 is close to unity and 
the portfolio adjustment simply answers to the need to optimize the certainty equivalent of its 
risky return. So, the sign of the reaction is determined by the covariance structure: 
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0 ~ ~ ~ 1














For contagion to take place it is necessary and sufficient that the element 
x
X ξ ~  of the inverse 
covariance matrix Ξ ~  be positive. In a hypothetical case of tradable loan portfolios, lending 22   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
contagion would be present for all international liquidity-unconstrained portfolio optimizers (such 
as hedge funds) and have nothing to do with the specifics of banking business. 
 
LS-bank without delegation 
Our principal result, equation (12), would look different if the foreign branch were not subject to 
delegated management. The corresponding equation for the substitute loan volume x ~  can be 
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.   (14) 
 
This equation characterizes the lending volume reaction to the other country lending activity 
shock in the bank branch operated by the shareholder without delegation. The reaction of this 
investor type in turn consists of two parts. The first term on the right hand side of (14) represents 
the reaction of a standard mean/variance optimizing investor, just like in the previously discussed 
benchmark case (recall that it originates in Z
L being one of the components of mean returns vector 
R ~). 
The second term can be both positive and negative, depending on the exact covariance structure of 
returns. One way of interpreting it is by referring to the previously discussed benchmark case as 
well. Let us imagine a benchmark arm’s length international LI-investor which is not a bank (does 
not take deposits) and has no initial capital (C=0). In particular, there are no short-selling 
constraints for any of the assets. Then, the scalar product  R
x ~ ~ ⋅ ξ  is proportional to this benchmark 
investor’s holdings x  of shares in the host country loan portfolio. We conclude that the second 
term on the right hand side of (14) would contribute to lending contagion if and only if the 
optimal behavior of the benchmark investor would require going short on the host country loan 
portfolio (i.e., both  R
x ~ ~ ⋅ ξ  and x  are negative). In a bank, going short on customer loans, which 
are not traded, is impossible, but the same motive will surface in the form of lending contagion. 
 
LI-bank with delegation 
This is the case covered by Corollary 1. To interpret the content of equation (13) from that 










− =  (a consequence of the inverse matrix definition). 
When an LI-bank without delegation (the benchmark case discussed earlier) hires a manager for 
its foreign branch, the term  2















′ ⋅ ′ − ~ 1
2 . That is, the vector 
x ω′  of covariances of the manager-generated returns with random vector ε
S (which consists of 
returns on other bank balance sheet items) takes the place of the vector 
x ω′ ~  of the substitute 
return covariances with the same random vector ε
S. As a result, cross-border risk transmission can 
take place as a specific consequence of management delegation. In particular, manager-generated 
covariances might be zero across countries (one can think of manager expertise with locally 
limited relevance), so that  0 = ′ ⋅ ′ X
x ξ ω . However, substitute covariances are generated by the 
multinational bank shareholder directly; therefore, they are generically non-zero. Accordingly, 
X
x ξ ω ′ ⋅ ′ ~  may be also non-zero, specifically, negative, giving rise to a lending contagion effect. 
 Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   23 
 
Another possible interpretation of (13) is indirect, based upon comparison of bank and non-bank 
investor behavior. To discuss it in this and the following case, we shall consider a hypothetical 
international non-bank liquidity-unconstrained investor of the hedge fund type (meaning that it is 
not leveraged by the deposits D and d and can raise an arbitrary amount of initial funds to invest; 
the constraint in the form of finite C-level will then disappear from its decision problem) who 
employs a manager to operate the host country asset portfolio. The manager has the same specific 
human capital with regard to the loan portfolio as in the bank case. He has full bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the investment fund shareholder and negotiates a fee according to the same principles as 
the bank branch manager discussed earlier. 
The manager so defined will pick the number x
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=     (15) 
 
(R* means the subvector of R ~ including all components except Z
L). From the second part of (15), 
we derive that - X
x ξ ω ′ ⋅ ′ ~  is the loading of the home country loan portfolio return in the hedging 
demand for host country loans. If this loading is positive (i.e., under delegated fund management, 
the hedging demand for host country loans depends positively on the home country loan returns), 
there would also exist lending contagion motives in a multinational bank with delegation, as 
expressed by (13). 
LS-bank with delegation 
This is the most general case, formally described by Proposition 2. In order to interpret the effects 
of sensitivity to the distance to failure on the lending contagion motives, we shall compare the 
earlier discussed case of an LS-bank without delegation (equation (14)) with the general result 
given in (12). Observe, by construction of the inverse matrix, that 
 






ξ 1  
 
(1
x denotes a vector with unity in the xth coordinate and zeros elsewhere). This means that (12) 
would boil down to (14) if the statistics of loan returns generated by the branch manager were the 
same as the ones generated by the shareholder as the substitute manager (i.e.,  , ~ R R = ω ω ~ = ). 
However, delegated management exists exactly for the reason that it is different and attractive to 
the shareholder. Consequently, in a branch going from direct to delegated management, there can 
appear additional motives for lending contagion. 
The second and third terms in (12), the same as the second term in (14), represent a reaction 
which can only be significant under moderate values of risk-adjusted distances to failure T and T ~ . 
The typical value of the coefficient by the scalar product  R
x ~ ~ ⋅ ξ  becomes negative with 
decreasing T ~ . We might call this element of portfolio adjustment, which is specific to LS-banks 
as opposed to other types of portfolio optimizers, precautionary capital rebudgeting. 
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When direct management is replaced by delegation, the second term on the right hand side of (14) 
evolves into two separate terms––the last two in (12)––which we could dub precautionary 
rebudgeting under delegation. The first of them, involving the mean returns other than the branch 
own return, might be called precautionary realignment, whereas the second one, involving only 
the mean return z
*l on the loans granted by the branch manager, could be called precautionary 
tuning or precautionary parallelism. 
It can be checked directly that the expression in square brackets in the last term in (12) takes 
positive values for meaningful values of the parameters. This means that precautionary tuning 
does not induce contagion. This is intuitive: one should not expect an increasing mean return on 
the host country loans exercise any other than a dampening influence on possible sources of 
contagious behavior. 
Precautionary realignment contributes to contagion every time the expression  R
x ~ ~ ⋅ Ξ′ ⋅ ′ ω  is 
positive. This is possible if the components of vector  Ξ′ ⋅ ′ ~ x ω  have the right signs and 
magnitudes. For instance, if the component corresponding to Z
L is positive, the one corresponding 
to –Z
A is negative and their absolute values dominate those of the remaining components, the 
result is contagion from home to host country lending. 
More generally, an interpretation of the precautionary realignment term in (12) can be given by 
comparing an LS-bank with delegation to an international investment fund (a non-deposit taking 
institution) with delegation, as in the previous case. The first part of (15), which describes the host 
country division manager choice of share number in the loan portfolio, shows that this number is 





 less the hedging term proportional to  R
x ~ ~ ⋅ Ξ′ ⋅ ′ ω . 
So, if the said hedging considerations by the non-deposit taking manager involve a reduction in 
host country lending compared to the Sharpe ratio benchmark, then, in a bank branch (which does 
not decide on lending volumes on the basis of standard hedging procedures, let alone cross-border 
ones), the same hedging term determines the sensitivity to the home country lending performance 
and contributes to contagion. 
 
Note that the precautionary realignment effect can only be significant in situations where the bank 
as a whole is sensitive to the risk-adjusted distance to failure (involving both the substitute level 
T ~  and the actual one T). That is, precautionary rebudgeting under delegation, the same as under 
direct arm’s length shareholder management, disappears in LI-banks (with low awareness of 
distance to failure). 
The distance to failure measure T which we apply in the model to the bank funds is, actually, a 
variant of the Sharpe ratio. More precisely, this is a Sharpe ratio in which mean excess returns are 
measured against the failure trigger Q
0 and which is, in addition, risk-adjusted by the term –γσQ. It 
would be useful to have some idea about reasonable values of T so that we could decide whether 
LS-banks or LI-banks would prevail if we decided to use this measure of liquidity. Clearly, failure 
trigger values for individual banks are unobservable. Returning to the discussion following 
Lemma 4 in Subsection 3.4, we observe that for our purposes it can only make sense to consider 
values of T for which the bank shareholder utility depends negatively on the volatility and 
positively on the trend of the bank funds. (This corresponds to positive values of coefficients K 
and L that appear in our theoretical results.) According to the numerical experiments conducted, 
this restriction does not preclude all three coefficients on the right hand side of (12) from being of Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   25 
 
comparable magnitudes, meaning a significant precautionary motive for lending contagion that 
can only be present in LS-banks. Overall, we conjecture that LS-banks should be dominant, even 
though moderate T-values by no means imply an actual danger of insolvency. What we consider 
probable is that even in a perfectly sound bank, LS-considerations may play a prominent role in 
shareholder preferences and decisions.  
As will become clear in the empirical part of this study, one can detect multinational banks both 
with and without signs of contagious behavior. The above model explains these differences in 
cross-border shock transmission within the sample by two factors. First, banks relying on 
delegated branch management can differ qualitatively from banks who manage international loan 
portfolios at arm’s length. Second, banks as such, if they face highly adverse alternatives to 
continued operation in the proximity of a hypothetical insolvency boundary, can exhibit 
contagious behavior even under conditions of full solvency. Therefore, the 
contagion/“octopusian” (cf. Introduction) reactions observed in many multinational banks in 
continental Europe might have to do with the highly interventionist attitude of bank regulators. 
4. Empirical Evidence on Cross-Border Lending Contagion 
4.1 Data Description 
In the empirical part we investigate a large set of parent banks worldwide that operated foreign 
branches and/or subsidiaries with a significant weight in total consolidated assets during the 
sample period 1999–2003. Our sample comprises 31 parent banks and 59 subsidiaries. Of the top 
ten largest banks in the world in terms of total assets (as of 2005), our sample covers all important 
subsidiary-operating banks: Mitsubishi-UFJ Financial Group, Citigroup, Mizuho Financial Group, 
HSBC Holdings, BNP Paribas, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Bank of America. The complete list 
of parent banks under consideration is given in Table 1. 
The parent banks under consideration have branches and subsidiaries in many countries. We 
looked at branches and subsidiaries in Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the USA. That is, we restricted our sample of host countries to OECD members 
and otherwise fully industrialized economies. The reason is that multinational bank activities in 
emerging and transition economies not only occupy a much more modest role in their total 
business, but also are often driven by motives and rules different from the ones valid for a 
standard industrialized environment. The other sample selection criteria were: a sufficient share of 
the foreign unit in total bank assets, a sufficiently prominent presence of the foreign unit in the 
host country commercial banking sector, the parent company of a foreign-owned bank being a 
commercial bank itself, and the existence of the parent and dependent units without major 
reorganizations for the majority of the years in the sample. 26   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
 
Table 1: List of parent banks 
  
1  Allied Irish Banks   17 Crédit Lyonnais 
2  American Express Company  18 Erste Bank 
3  Banca Intesa   19 Foereningssparbanken - Swedbank 
4  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   20 GE Capital International Financing Corp. 
5  Banco Comercial Portugues  21 HSBC Holdings 
6  Banco de Sabadell   22 ING Groep  
7  Banco Santander Central  23 MBNA Corporation 
8  Bank of America Corporation  24 Merrill Lynch & Co. 
9  Bank of Ireland  25 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group  
10  Royal Bank of Scotland  26 Mizuho Corporate Bank 
11  Barclays Bank  27 National Australia Bank  
12  Bayerische Hypo und Vereinsbank  28
13  BNP Paribas  
Raiffeisen-Holding Niederoesterreich-Wien 
 
14  CERA (KBC)  29 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken  
15  Citigroup   30 Société Générale 
16  Commerzbank    31  Unicredito Italiano 
      
 
In order to capture host and home country macroeconomic developments, we collected data on 
inflation, GDP growth, long-term yields on government bonds, and exchange rate volatility 
between the parent bank country currency and the subsidiary country currency. Exchange rate 
volatility was measured as the standard deviation of the monthly average growth rates of the 
exchange rate from the average annual growth rate. This measure excludes the long-term trend 
element of exchange rate behavior, against which, as we presume, multinational banks are able to 
protect themselves at a low cost (and also excludes cases of fully anticipated policy-driven trends 
as in crawling peg regimes, e.g. in Hungary and Poland). So, we only analyze the role of short-
term exchange rate uncertainty on the decisions concerning lending abroad. (Recall that the model 
of Section 3 predicts that such uncertainty will impact on lending behavior.) 
To measure the parent bank cost of managing the credit risk of the home country loan portfolio (to 
be called CR-cost in what follows), we take the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. We study 
in particular the effect that the CR-cost of the parent bank can have on the lending volume in the 
subsidiary bank, controlling for macroeconomic variables and bank specific decisions.  
The data used in the analysis originate from the BankScope database. The descriptive statistics for 
the indicators over 1999–2003 are presented in Table 2. Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   27 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
    
   mean std.  dev.  min  max 
Growth of subsidiary’s total loans  22.78 57.95 -56.72 648.1 
Parent bank loan loss reserves to total loans ratio  0.039 0.069 0.005  0.56 
Exchange rate volatility  0.97 0.701  0.0  3.53 
GDP growth        
     home country  2.7  2.07  -1.1  11.1 
     host country  3.5  2.58  -1.7  11.1 
Inflation        
     home country  2.24  1.19  -0.9  5.8 
     host country  3.63  3.23  -1.1  15 
Long-term interest rate        
     home country  4.82  0.86  0.99  6.25 
     host country  7.22  4.55  3.0  24.1 
 
From the table it is apparent that credit creation at the subsidiary level evolved quite dynamically, 
with the mean rate of growth of total loans reaching nearly 23 percent. Nevertheless, the variance 
of the rate of growth was very high. The ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans averaged 4 
percent and varied quite significantly, by 7 percent. The exchange rate volatility between the 
parent bank home and subsidiary host country currencies fluctuated around a mean of 1 percent 
with a standard deviation of 0.7 percentage points, with the maximum fluctuation reaching 3.53 
per cent. Moreover, it follows from the descriptive statistics that GDP growth in the host countries 
exceeded that in the home countries by one percentage point on average. Inflation was also 1.5 
percent higher in the host countries than in the home countries, and, finally, long-term interest 
rates were 2 percentage points higher on average in the host countries than in the home countries. 
In addition, the indicators for the host countries, as well as showing higher average values, are 
more volatile than those for the home countries. This is consistent with higher returns in the host 
countries, albeit with higher uncertainty. 
Note that we do not use aggregate host country credit growth as an explanatory variable. 
According to the verification that we conducted, the same underlying growth factor is to a large 
extent already contained in the GDP series. One is unlikely to find additional drivers of MNB 
credit growth in the countries of penetration, given that penetration takes place only into 
economies with a clear borrowing demand growth potential. 
4.2 Estimation results 
The estimation was carried out using the fixed effects estimator, where the fixed effects represent 
the autonomous decision of every subsidiary bank in terms of its credit creation. We ran two types 
of regression: parenthood and regional regression.  
In the parenthood regression we investigated the sign and significance of the relationship between 
CR-cost in the parent bank and lending growth in the subsidiary. In order to address the issue of 
possibly different behavior of parent banks toward their subsidiary banks in reaction to the parent 
banks’ CR-cost, as follows from the theoretical model in the first part, we performed a detailed 28   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
regression in which for each parent bank we estimated the bank-specific reaction of the subsidiary 
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where L denotes the volume of credit granted, αi is the fixed effect of subsidiary i, GDP represents 
the gross domestic product of the respective country (host or home), π denotes inflation (host or 
home), i is the long-term interest rate (host or home), σER is the standard deviation of the exchange 
rate between the home and host country, and, finally, LLP stands for loan loss provisions. Terms ε 
represent i.i.d. disturbances. 
We grouped the parent banks that turned out to have the same sign of the bank-specific coefficient 
and performed a two-group regression, namely, groups with a negative and positive effect on 
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where LLP19 and LLP12 are the loan loss provisions for, respectively, the 19 banks and 12 banks in 
the groups of positive and negative detailed regression coefficient δ in (16). 
In the case of the regional regression, we grouped the parent banks according to the countries 
where they operate subsidiaries. In this way, we created four blocks of countries (subsidiary 
regions, SR): Central and Eastern Europe, Old Industrial Countries, New Industrial Countries, and 
Baltic Countries. Central and Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia; the Old Industrial Countries are Canada, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland, the UK, 
and the USA; the New Industrial Countries are represented by Mexico, Turkey, and Korea; and 
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The results of the estimations are displayed in Table 3. In the parenthood regression, we tested an 
unrestricted model containing the entire set of the variables considered, i.e., home as well as host 
key macroeconomic variables. By excluding the statistically insignificant variables we derived the 
restricted specification. The overall variability in the data explained by our model remains 
unaffected by the exclusion of the redundant variables. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates in 
the restricted specification became more efficient without substantial changes in parameter values 
(the Hausman specification test, Hausman (1978), yields χ
2
5(2.06) = 0.85). In the case of the Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   29 
 
regional regression we report the restricted specification only. The choice of the fixed effects 
model was confirmed by high correlations of residuals with covariates, and plain ordinary least 
squares were rejected by the F-test. We did not opt for a dynamic specification, as the serial 
autocorrelation in the error term turned out to be very low (DW = 1.99). The low past dependence 
might be related to the relatively short time span used, as the average bank is observed for 4.5 
years. The empirical specifications (16)–(18) exhibit satisfactory explanatory power, given the 
type of regression.  






   unrestricted restricted  restricted 
Intercept 
a) 14.82(24.18)  35.82***(12.4)  22.6**(11.35) 
Home country GDP growth  1.79(1.96)  -  - 
Home country inflation  1.31(3.56)  -  - 
Home country long-term interest rate  4.01(5.47)  -  - 
Host country GDP growth  -1.28(1.07)  -  - 
Host country inflation  -3.94***(1.41)  -3.24***(1.31)  -3.57***(1.35) 
Host country long-term interest rate 4.99***(1.02)  4.82***(0.99)  4.99***(1.01) 
Exchange rate volatility  -8.9**(4.55)  -7.22*(4.35)  -7.09*(4.4) 
Parent’s loan loss reserves to total loans ratio:          
   Group 19 (negative sign in detailed 
regression) -17.51***(4.86) -18.36***(4.73) - 
   Group 12 (positive sign in detailed 
regression) 10.26*(5.76) 9.42*(5.67)  - 
   Number of subsidiary banks/parent banks  59/31  59/31  - 
   Central and Eastern Europe 
b) -  -  -17.81***(5.56)
   Old Industrialized Countries 
c)     -0.36  (5.36) 
   New Industrialized Countries 
d) -  -  26.10(18.14) 
   Baltic Countries 
e) -  -  21.29(77.21) 
Sigma u/sigma e/rho  1.64/0.29/0.97  1.67/0.29/0.97  1.68/ 0.3/ 0.97 
Correlation of residuals with covariates  -0.937  -0.941  -0.937 
Hausman specification test  -  χ
2
5(2.06) = 0.85  - 
DW 1.99  1.994  1.98 
Favor fixed-effects vs. plain OLS  F(58,196)=3.94 F(58,200)=4.37 F(58,199)=4.42 
R-square: within/between/overall  0.21/ 0.71/ 0.32  0.19/ 0.71/ 0.33  0.18/ 0.62/ 0.28 
Note:   annual data 1999–2003; 264 observations; standard errors in parenthesis; time observations per 
parent bank: min 2/avg 4.5/max 5. 
a) The intercept represents the average over the set of fixed 
effects.  
b) The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary.
 c) Canada, Ireland, Portugal, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
 d) Mexico, Turkey, and Korea; 
e) 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
 
As we can see from Table 3, the home factors turn out to be relatively unimportant, while, on the 
contrary, host country economic developments prove to be very influential. This finding suggests 
that general macroeconomic developments in the home country are not a significant source of 
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insensitive banks (i.e., those who act more or less like standard portfolio optimizers, cf. 
Subsection 3.5), which should stay in relation to asset return statistics co-driven by macro 
fundamentals, might be of subordinate importance empirically. 
On the contrary, the host country factors, particularly inflation, long-term yields, and 
exchange rate volatility, play an important role. An increase in host country inflation by one 
percent decreases the growth of total loans in a branch/subsidiary in that country by roughly 3 
percent. Also, an increase in the host country long-term interest rate by one percent increases 
the growth of loans by nearly 5 percent. A percentage increase in exchange rate volatility 
reduces lending by 7 percent. The latter result promotes the exchange rate to the role of the 
variable with the most sizeable influence. 
Finally, when testing the impact of the CR-costs of the parent bank on credit growth in the 
subsidiary, we found a statistically significant relation. This proves that not only do host 
country factors matter, but the intermediated influence of home factors through parent bank 
operations can be statistically verified as well. Specifically, two-thirds of the parent banks in 
our sample restrict lending in their subsidiaries in response to a loan quality deterioration at 
home, i.e., they exhibit intra-bank lending contagion. One-third of the banks behave inversely, 
i.e., they increase lending in their subsidiaries as a result of growing CR-cost at home, 
although the effect is smaller and statistically weaker than that for the group of banks prone to 
contagion.  
In the multinational bank list in Table 1, parent banks that reduce lending in their branches 
and subsidiaries in the case of a parent bank CR-cost shock are featured in italics. Conversely, 
the remaining banks, featured in boldface, behave more like conventional cross-border 
portfolio diversifiers. 
To what extent the results are driven by differences in the regions where the subsidiary banks 
operate can be examined with the help of regional regressions. The results suggest that the 
parent banks that run subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe typically show signs of intra-
bank lending contagion. This is not very surprising, given the high degree of economic 
integration of this region with the euro area, from where most of the penetrating MNBs there 
originate. According to the popular view, the penetration itself has contributed substantially to 
credit growth due to technology and know-how transfer into the dependent units. However, 
our analysis was not designed to look for lending contagion in the credit growth figures as 
such, but rather in the deviations from the growth trend caused by parent bank-related factors. 
And, indeed, coming to the same region each MNB behaved somewhat differently. 
Nevertheless, the majority, if not all of them, show signs of home-host contagion. 
On the contrary, parent banks that operate subsidiaries in the old industrialized, newly 
industrialized and Baltic countries behave differently. More generally, we can select banks 
with lending contagion behavior by looking at the results for individual parent banks (see the 
outcomes of the parenthood regressions in Section 4). Then, in the sublist of multinational 
banks prone to lending contagion, we mostly find European banks with dependent units in 
other European countries. In those, sensitivity to liquidity (the LS-effect of Section 3) is likely 
to be more pronounced (meaning that outside intervention due to an increasing probability of 
illiquidity is more likely to happen there than in other jurisdictions). For instance, relatively 
“easy” intervention triggers, as a result of the dominant interventionist regulatory attitude of Cross-Border Lending Contagion in Multinational Banks   31 
 
policymakers in Europe, should put most of these banks in the LS-category in our 
terminology. That is, we would often observe precautionary rebudgeting in response to CR-
cost shocks––specifically, precautionary realignment. (Recall that we call precautionary 
realignment the impact on the host country branch lending volume sensitivity to the home 
country lending return, coming from asset characteristics available to the multinational bank 
as a whole.) The latter effect should be considered a likely explanation of lending contagion 
in the group of banks considered. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper introduced a model of a multinational bank dependent on the specific human capital of 
the foreign branch management. The model is applied to a risk-averse bank shareholder operating 
a domestic branch herself and employing a manager with specific skills in the foreign country. We 
investigated the reaction of the foreign country branch to a shock happening to asset returns in the 
home country, and compared it to the reaction to the same shock of a bank acting as an arm’s-
length investor. The key notion that we founded our analysis upon is the hypothetical substitute 
decision making of a bank shareholder in case she decides to do without the manager’s skills and 
save on his fees. The substitute portfolio decisions are different from the actual decisions of the 
manager. The latter bases his effort and lending choices on the intention to stay marginally more 
attractive to the shareholder than her own substitute management of the branch. 
Since the manager’s fee derives from his ability to outperform the shareholder’s substitute 
earnings, the lending volume is influenced by variables outside the branch. And those, given the 
shareholder’s intertwined decisions worldwide, are cross-border interdependent. So, formally, 
although the investment opportunity set of the manager is strictly local (limited to host country 
lending), he is forced to think “globally”. This is the agency phenomenon able to produce lending 
contagion. 
Quantitative differences in the shock response in an international portfolio-optimizing 
environment with and without the agency problems have been found, as expected. More 
importantly, we have found that there might also be qualitative differences. That is, if the country 
is foreign to the shock, the latter can have opposite impacts on credit creation in an arm’s-length 
bank branch than in a branch with delegated management. In the model, this happens only on 
condition of a bank with a high sensitivity to the distance to failure in terms of a modified Sharpe 
ratio of its assets. The factor responsible for this phenomenon is manager sensitivity to possible 
termination of the parent bank’s operation. 
The panel regression conducted on a large sample of multinational banks has shown the presence 
of lending contagion in 19 out of the 31 parent banks examined. When one looks at the 
phenomenon from the point of view of the region that hosts the foreign banks, the one with a 
significant contagion effect is Central and Eastern Europe. In view of our theoretical analysis, one 
might conjecture that the foreign banks operating there are most likely to rely on delegated 
management. (Indeed, in most cases, penetration meant taking over pre-existing institutions with 
some business history.) In other cases, inconclusive or diversification-favoring estimation results 
could be explained by adherence of the parent banks to arm’s length management principles 
(newly industrialized countries) or close proximity of the home and host country bank loan 32   Alexis Derviz and Jiří Podpiera  
 
markets with little space for managerial capture effect, and the small relative size of the controlled 
foreign units (as in the Baltic countries). 
A frequently posed question is the influence of exchange rate noise on foreign bank operation. 
This issue is not considered in full detail, but the model suggests that, as with any other external 
shock, branches of tightly regulated banks are more sensitive to exchange rate volatility than 
branches of financial institutions resembling other types of international investors. Empirically, 
the exchange rate uncertainty between the home and the host economies is the strongest 
explanatory factor of lending contagion in banks which are prone to it. The result is robust to the 
regional grouping of dependent units as well as the inclusion of alternative macroeconomic 
explanatory variables for the parent bank home country. 
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